Английский язык. Практический курс для решения бизнес-задач - Нина Пусенкова

While LJM shocked many, the deal was just the latest version of a financing strategy that Skilling and Fastow had used many times since the mid-’90s to fund investments with private equity while keeping assets and debt off the balance sheet. «They were put together with good intentions to offset some risk,» says S&P analyst Ron Barone. «It’s conceivable that it got away from them.»

Did it ever. The off-balance-sheet structures grew increasingly complex and risky. Some, with names like Osprey, Whitewing, and Marlin, were revealed in Enron’s financial filings and even rated by the big credit-rating agencies. But almost no one seemed to have a clear picture of Enron’s total debt, what might hasten repayment, or how some of the deals could dilute shareholder equity. «No one ever sat down and added up how many liabilities would come due if this company got downgraded,» says one lender. Many investors were unaware of provisions in some deals that could dump the debts back on Enron. At the same time, the value of the assets in many of these partnerships was dropping, making it even harder for Enron to cover the debt.

In theory, Enron had mechanisms in place to assess risk and accurately report financial numbers. Enron’s external auditor was the once-venerable Arthur Andersen, dubbed the «Marine Corps of accounting» for the hard-nosed attention to accounting standards it once exemplified. Enron required that deals be rigorously analysed, a process that often included review by the legal department of the originating unit, the corporate legal department, the chief risk officer and chief accounting officer.

However, the system of checks and balances in Enron was easily overridden. Deal originators could determine the total value of their proposals by manipulating the long-term price for whatever was being bought or sold. Their bonuses were based on the total value of the deal, not the cash it brought in. All this was designed to boost the quarterly reports, made possible by «mark-to-market» accounting, a system Skilling pushed Enron to adopt in 1991 that allows a company to report as current revenue the total value of a deal over its projected lifetime. Mark-to-market in Enron made earnings look good, pumping up the stock price and increasing the value of stock options executives received as compensation. «It was a moral hazard being able to record your profits immediately,» one former executive said. «It created many temptations.»

High hopes. Skilling was determined not to scale back his grandiose broadband trading dreams or the resulting price-to-earnings multiple of almost 60 that they helped create for Enron’s stock. At its peak in August, 2000, about a third of the stock’s $90 price was attributable to expectations for growth of broadband trading.

That rapidly rising stock price – up 55% in ‘99 and 87% in 2000 – gave Skilling and Fastow a hot currency for luring investors into their off-balance-sheet deals. They quickly became dependent on such deals to finance their expansion efforts. Trouble is, Enron’s stock came tumbling back to earth when market valuations fell in 2001. Its far-flung operational troubles were taking their own toll. In its broadband business, for instance, overcapacity and drop of share prices made it hard to find creditworthy parties for trading. And after spending some $1.2 billion to build and operate a fiber-optic network, Enron found itself with an asset whose value was rapidly deteriorating.

«Something to prove.» And the international problems weren’t going away. Enron’s 65% stake in the $3 billion Dabhol power plant in India was mired in a dispute with its largest customer, which refused to pay for electricity. Some Indian politicians have despised the deal for years, claiming that cunning and even corrupt Enron executives cut a deal that charged India too much for its power.

Enron’s ill-fated 1998 investment in the water-services business was another drag on earnings. Many saw the purchase of Wessex Water in England as a «consolation prize» for Rebecca Mark, Enron executive who had negotiated the Dabhol deal. The Wessex deal formed the core of Azurix Corp., to be run by Mark. But British regulators reduced the rates the utility could charge. Meanwhile, Mark acquired more high-priced water assets. «Once (Skilling) put her there, he let her go wild,» says a former executive. «And she’s going to go wild because she has something to prove.»

But if Azurix was a prime example of Enron’s investment strategy, it also demonstrated how the company tried to disguise its problems with financial alchemy. To set up the company, Enron formed a partnership called the Atlantic Water Trust, in which it held a 50% stake. That kept Wessex off Enron’s balance sheet. Enron’s partner in the joint venture was Marlin Water Trust, which consisted of institutional investors. To attract them, Enron promised to back up the debt with its own stock if necessary. But if Enron’s credit rating fell below investment grade and the stock fell below a certain point, Enron could be responsible for the partnership’s $915 million in debt.

Some partnerships had been questioned by an executive, Sherron Watkins, the whistle-blower of the scandal. She voiced her alarm in a letter to Lay saying, «I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting scandals.»

The end for Enron came when its murky finances frightened off investors and Dynegy. Dynegy’s bankers spent hours studying a supposedly final draft of Enron’s about-to-be-released report – only to discover two pages of damning new numbers when the quarterly statement was made publicly available. Debt coming due in the fourth quarter increased from under $1 billion to $2.8 billion. Even worse, cash on hand shrunk from $3 billion to $1.2 billion. Dynegy «had a two-hour meeting with the new treasurer of Enron, who had been in that seat for two weeks,» said a source close to the deal. «He had no clue where the numbers came from.»

Respect for assets. On Dec. 5, a suit was filed against Fastow, Skilling, and 27 other Enron executives. They were charged with illegally making more than $1 billion off stock sales before Enron collapsed.

Would the cash squeeze have caught up to Enron, even without Skilling’s and Fastow’s fancy financing? Credit analysts argue that the debt would have been manageable without the crisis of confidence that dried up Enron’s trading business and access to the capital markets. But even they have a new respect for old-fashioned, high-quality assets. «When things get really tough, hard assets are the kind you can depend upon,» says S&P’s Shipman. That’s something Enron’s whiz-kid financiers failed to appreciate.

Source: Business Week (online), December 17, 2001 (abridged)

Essential Vocabulary

1. vertically integrated companies – вертикально-интегрированные компании

2. market maker – «делатель рынка»: участник финансового рынка, который постоянно котирует цены покупателя и продавца и вступает по ним в сделки по финансовым инструментам за свой счет или за счет своих клиентов

3. off-balance-sheet – забалансовый

4. stock analyst – аналитик акций

5. affiliate n – аффилированная компания

6. shareholder equity (SE) – ценность компании для акционеров: все активы минус все обязательства компании

7. uncertainty n – неопределенность

uncertain a – неопределенный

8. resignation n – уход в отставку, отставка

resign v – отказываться от должности, слагать обязанности, уходить в отставку

9. deregulation n – дерегулирование: уменьшение государственного регулирования кредитной системы, финансовых рынков для поощрения действия рыночных сил и повышения эффективности экономики

10. overseas a – заграничный, иностранный

11. Standard & Poor’s (S&P) – Стэндард энд Пурс (США): ведущая фирма по финансовому консультированию и установлению кредитного рейтинга ценных бумаг

12. credit rating – кредитный рейтинг

13. investment-grade credit rating – кредитный рейтинг инвестиционного уровня

14. start-up n – создание новой компании; вновь созданная компания; время, необходимое для начала производства и доведения до оптимального уровня после заключения контракта

start up v – создавать новую компанию

startup a – только что созданный

15. scholarship n – стипендия

16. rank n – ряд, порядок; звание, чин, должность, ранг

ranking n – расположение, расстановка, ранжирование

17. debt n – долг, долговые инструменты

debtor n – должник

18. repayment n – выплата, возврат, погашение

repay v – выплачивать, возвращать, погашать

19. dilution n – разбавление, разводнение (капитала)

dilute v – разбавлять, разводнять

20. liability n – обязательство, задолженность, пассив

21. downgrade v – присвоить более низкий рейтинг, понижать

22.lender n – кредитор, заимодавец

lend v – одалживать, давать взаймы

23. provision n – снабжение, обеспечение; резерв, запас; положение, условие

24. checks and balances – система сдержек и противовесов

25. originator n – инициатор операций; инвестиционный банк, работающий с потенциальным эмитентом с самой ранней стадии планирования займа

26. mark-to-market – ежедневная переоценка биржевых позиций для учета изменения цен, переоценка портфеля ценных бумаг на основе текущих цен; ежедневная переоценка чистых активов

27. price-to-earnings (P/E) – отношение цены акции к прибыли

28. multiple n – множитель, коэффициент

29. peak n – пик, максимум

peak v – достичь пика, максимума

30. creditworthiness n – кредитоспособность

creditworthy a – кредитоспособный

31. utility n – польза, экономическая выгода; коммунальное предприятие

32. joint venture (JV) – совместное предприятие

33. whistle-blower – лицо, поднявшее тревогу при обнаружении злоупотребления

34. quarter (Q) n – квартал

quarterly a – квартальный

35. treasury n – казначейство, казначейский департамент

treasurer n – казначей

36. file a suit – подать иск

Exercise 1. Answer the following questions.

1. What was Enron’s attitude towards tangible assets? 2. For what purpose were Enron’s partnerships set up? 3. How was Enron established and how did it evolve over 15 years? 4. How did professionals initially perceive Enron? 5. Why was Enron having financial problems? 6. What did Enron do to counteract the growing competition in energy trading? 7. What was the financial strategy that Enron employed? 8. How did its CFO contribute to Enron’s collapse? 9. What kind of problems did Enron have with its international projects? 10. What were the key strategic mistakes that Enron made?

Exercise 2*. Find terms in the text that match definitions given below and make sentences of your own with each term.

1. insolvent debtor

2. a person appointed and authorized to examine books of account

3. a rival for sales of the same or similar merchandise

4. the legal combination of corporations in which their assets are transferred to the resulting successor corporation

5. the aid or award given to a student by a fund, school, or institution, on the basis of his merit or need

6. the act of pledging, obligating, or engaging oneself

7. to equalize or counterbalance; to compensate

8. a process instituted in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right or claim

9. the innermost or the most essential part of anything

10. accumulation of stores or materials beforehand; a stipulation

Exercise 3. Name Enron’s stakeholders and describe how they were affected by its collapse.