Английский язык. Практический курс для решения бизнес-задач - Нина Пусенкова

Value-Based Management и показатели стоимости

Value-Based Management – концепция управления, направленная на качественное улучшение стратегических и оперативных решений на всех уровнях организации за счет концентрации усилий всех лиц, принимающих решения, на ключевых факторах стоимости. Из всего множества альтернативных целевых функций в рамках концепции VBM выбирается максимизация стоимости компании. Стоимость же компании определяется ее дисконтированными будущими денежными потоками, и новая стоимость создается лишь тогда, когда компании получают такую отдачу от инвестированного капитала, которая превышает затраты на привлечение капитала.

Но, как известно, для того чтобы управлять чем-либо, необходимо уметь это измерять. В приложении к VBM это означает, что необходим инструмент, позволяющий оценить отдачу от инвестированного в компанию капитала. Таким образом, мы можем выделить основные факторы, влияющие на стоимость компании, которые обязательно должны учитываться в показателе, отражающем создание стоимости – затраты на собственный и заемный капитал и доходы, генерируемые существующими активами (при этом доход может выражаться в различных формах: прибыль, денежный поток и т. д.). В 80—90-х годах появился целый ряд показателей (на основе некоторых из них в дальнейшем возникли даже системы управления: например, EVA и EVA-based management), отражающие процесс создания стоимости. Наиболее известные из них – EVA, MVA, SVA, CVA и CFROI.

Market Value Added (MVA)

По-видимому, MVA – самый очевидный критерий создания стоимости, рассматривающий в качестве последней рыночную капитализацию и рыночную стоимость долгов компании.

MVA рассчитывается как разница между рыночной ценой капитала и инвестированным в компанию капиталом:

MVA = рыночная стоимость долга + рыночная капитализация – совокупный капитал

С точки зрения теории корпоративных финансов MVA отражает дисконтированную стоимость всех настоящих и будущих инвестиций.

Показатель, лежащий в основе системы VBM, должен не только отражать стоимость компании, но и показывать эффективность принятия решений на всех уровнях иерархии, а также служить инструментом мотивации. Рассматриваемый показатель (MVA) не отвечает данным требованиям, т. к. на рыночную капитализацию оказывают влияние многие факторы, часть из которых неподконтрольна менеджменту компании.

Более того, если результаты работы компании будут оцениваться по данному показателю и мотивационные схемы будут также привязаны к нему, то это может привести к тому, что руководство будет принимать решения, оказывающие краткосрочное влияние на курсовую стоимость акций, но разрушающие стоимость в долгосрочной перспективе (например, программы сокращения затрат за счет масштабного сокращения бюджета научно-исследовательских разработок). Но, как известно, одной из основных целей системы VBM является координация и мотивация принятия решений, ведущих к созданию долгосрочных конкурентных преимуществ, так как стоимость компании определяется суммой будущих денежных потоков. В ответ на данные недостатки возник целый ряд альтернативных показателей стоимости.

Economic Value Added (EVA)

Наверно, из всех существующих показателей, предназначенных для оценки процесса создания стоимости компании, EVA является самым известным и распространенным. Причина этого в том, что данный показатель сочетает простоту расчета и возможность определения стоимости компании, а также позволяет оценивать эффективность как предприятия в целом, так и отдельных подразделений. EVA является индикатором качества управленческих решений: постоянная положительная величина этого показателя свидетельствует об увеличении стоимости компании, тогда как отрицательная – о ее снижении.

Источник: В.Д. Степанов (отрывок из статьи), www.man.con.ua

Lesson 13

Conflict between Managers and Shareholders

Read and translate the text and learn terms from the Essential Vocabulary.

Agency Problem

Role of Shareholders and Role of Managers

Although ordinary shareholders are the owners of the company to whom the board of directors are accountable, the actual powers of shareholders tend to be restricted. They have no right to inspect the books of account, and their forecasts of future prospects are gleaned from the annual report and accounts, stockbrokers, journals and newspapers.

The day-to-day running of a company is the responsibility of the directors and other managers to whom they delegate, not the shareholders. For these reasons, there is potential for conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders.

Shareholders used to take a passive role in the affairs of the company. It was once common to play down their influence. This has changed partly because of a change in the type of shareholder, partly due to takeover activity and partly because of social pressures. Shareholding has changed from private investors to institutional investors, who are able to employ experts to advise on the investment strategy. The company must accordingly be run in a way that guarantees the satisfaction of an increasingly sophisticated shareholder, who will both be competent and keen to assess for himself the truth behind any optimistic statements.

The power that the institutional shareholders have over a company rests on the effect that their investment decisions can have on the share price of a company, on the fact that at times of takeover bid the decision of a few shareholders can have a major influence on whether the bid succeeds or fail, and on the fact that the institutions have large amount of funds that can be made available to a company. The institutions need the companies, as they need good investment opportunities in a healthy economic climate, in order to be able to meet their future pension and assurance obligations.

Agency Theory and Agency Problems

The relationship between management and shareholders is referred to as an agency relationship, in which managers act as agents for the shareholders, using delegated powers to run the affairs of the company in the best interest of the shareholders.

Agency problem is a potential conflict of interest between the agent (manager) and the outside shareholders and the creditors. For example, if managers hold none or very little shares of the company they work for, what is to stop them from working inefficiently, not bothering to look for profitable new investments, or giving themselves high salary or perks?

Agency theory proposes that, although the individual members of the business team act in their own self interest, the well being of each individual depends on the well being of other team members and on the performance of the team in competition with other teams.

One power that shareholders possess is the right to remove the directors from office but shareholders have to take initiative to do this, and in many companies the shareholders lack energy and organization to take such a step. Even so, directors will want the company’s report and accounts, and the proposed final dividend, to meet with the shareholders’ approval at annual general meeting.

Another source of conflict between managers and shareholders is that they have different attitude towards risk. A shareholder can spread his risk by investing his money in a number of companies. A manager’s financial security usually depends on what happens to the one company that employs him. The manager could therefore be more risk averse than the shareholder and not eager to invest in risky projects.

Another situation in which conflicts can arise is when a company is subject to takeover bid. The shareholders of the acquired firm very often receive above normal gains for the share price while managers lose their jobs; if lucky they may be picked by the new shareholders. Therefore, it is not always in the shareholders’ interest that the sought-after companies put up such a defense to drive the bidder away.

Goal Congruence

Goal congruence is the accord between the objectives of agents acting within an organization and the objectives of the organization as a whole. Managers can be encouraged to act in shareholders’ best interests through incentives which reward them for good performance but punish them for poor performance:

Profit related pay. If managers are rewarded according to the level of profit they will strive to achieve high profit levels. Shareholders’ wealth is going to increase, so too is the value of the firm. Sometimes such act might just encourage creative accounting whereby management will distort the reported performance of the company in the service of the managers’ own ends.

Rewarding managers with shares. This might be done when a company goes public and managers are invited to subscribe for shares in the company at an attractive offer price. Managers will have a stake in the business and will venture only into those projects that enhance the share value of the business.

Direct intervention by shareholders. The pattern of shareholding has changed from passive private investors to aggressive intuitional investors. These shareholders have direct influence over the performance of an enterprise. They actively check the performance of the company and are quick to lobby other small shareholders when they suspect poor service or any malpractice by the directors.

Threat of firing. Shareholders can take a direct approach by threatening the managers with dismissal if they put their personal interest above maximization of the firm’s value. Institutional investors enhanced the shareholders powers to dismiss directors as they are able to lobby other shareholders in decision making.

Threats of takeover. Managers would do everything possible to frustrate takeovers as they are aware that they can lose their jobs. To promote goal congruence the shareholders may threaten to accept takeover bid if managers do not meet their set targets.

Source: http//cbdd.wsu.edu

Conflict Between Managers and Shareholders

In the catechism of capitalism, shares represent the part-ownership of an economic enterprise. The value of shares is determined by the replacement value of the assets of the firm, including intangibles such as goodwill. The price of the share is determined by transactions among arm’s length buyers and sellers in an efficient and liquid market. The price reflects expectations regarding the future value of the firm and the stock’s future stream of income – i.e., dividends.

Alas, none of these oft-recited dogmas bears any resemblance to reality. Shares rarely represent ownership. The free float is frequently marginal. Shareholders meet once a year to vent their displeasure and disperse. BoDs are appointed by management – as are auditors. Shareholders are not represented in any decision making process.

The truth is that shares represent the expectation to find future buyers at a higher price and thus incur capital gains. In the stock exchange, this expectation is proportional to liquidity and volatility. Thus, the price of any given stock reflects the consensus as to how easy it would be to offload one’s holdings and at what price.

Another myth has to do with the role of managers. They are supposed to generate higher returns to shareholders by increasing the value of the firm’s assets and, therefore, of the firm. If they fail to do so, goes the moral tale, they are booted out mercilessly. This is one manifestation of the «Principal-Agent Problem». It is defined thus by the Oxford Dictionary of Economics: «The problem of how a person A can motivate person B to act for A’s benefit rather than following (his) self-interest.»

The obvious answer is that A can never motivate B not to follow B’s self-interest – never mind what the incentives are. That economists pretend otherwise just serves to demonstrate how divorced economics is from human psychology and from reality.

Managers will always rob blind the companies they run. They will always manipulate boards to collude in their shenanigans. They will always bribe auditors to bend the rules. In other words, they will always act in their self-interest. In their defense, they can say that the damage from such actions to each shareholder is minuscule while the benefits to the manager are enormous.